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APARTMENT FOR RENT-CHILDREN NOT
ALLOWED: THE ILLINOIS CHILDREN IN
HOUSING STATUTE-ITS VIABILITY AND A
PROPOSAL FOR ITS COMPREHENSIVE
AMENDMENT
James M. O'Brien*
and
Frank J. Fitzgerald**
Illinois has had a law prohibiting discrimination in rental
housing against persons with children since 1909. In this Article,
the authors explore the viability of this statute by analyzing the
results of several in-depth surveys taken during the early part
of 1975, and by comparing it to similar statutes in other states.
Concluding that the present statute is ineffective, the authors
propose the adoption of a comprehensive amendment, which
encompasses aspects of other state statutes, as well as several
innovative sections. The merit and constitutionality of these
new proposals are also commented on. The authors feel that
passage of this proposed Act by the Illinois legislature will
finally provide an effective remedy to the victims of family
status discrimination in rental housing.
I. INTRODUCTION
For over a century the prevention of discrimination in housing
has been an important focal point of legislative activity at the
federal, state and local levels. One of the earliest expressions of
this interest is found in the Civil Rights Act of 1866, wherein
Congress affirmed the real property rights of nonwhite citizens of
the United States.' Evidence of additional and concentrated in-
terest of the federal government may be found in the Housing Act
of 1949,2 the Civil Rights Act of 19641 and the Fair Housing Act
of 1968.1 Indeed, Congress has made the following declaration:
* Member of the Illinois Bar and practicing attorney in the City of Chicago, B.A.
DePaul University, J.D. DePaul University College of Law.
**B.S. St. Joseph's College, J.D. DePaul University College of Law.
1. 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1970).
2. Housing Act of 1949, ch. 338, 63 Stat. 413 (codified in scattered sections of 12, 14
U.S.C.).
3. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000 et seq. (1970).
4. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601 et seq. (1970).
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the general welfare and security of the Nation and the health
and living standards of its people require. . .the realization as
soon as feasible of the goal of a decent home and a suitable living
environment for every American family. .... 5
Similarly, numerous state and municipal legislative bodies have
enacted comparable measures.'
Although the purpose of these earlier housing laws was to pro-
hibit discrimination on the basis of race or color, subsequent
measures have prohibited discrimination based upon national
origin, religion' and sex.' Considerably less attention, however,
has been focused upon another basis for discrimination, the exist-
ence of children in the family of a prospective tenant. Regardless
of the limited attention that this type of discrimination has re-
ceived, the effects of such family status discrimination can be as
detrimental to its victims as the adverse effects of the more no-
ticeable types of discrimination, e.g. inferior education, reduced
proximity to employment, loss of neighborhood relationships and
contacts, social embarrassment and similar personal, business,
and social consequences.' Recently the federal government has
attempted to treat the problem, albeit in a limited fashion. '" Iso-
5. Exec. Order No. 11,063, 3 C.F.R. 652 (Supp. 1959-63). This sentiment has been
echoed by numerous legal commentators, for example:
The economic situation of the tenant-family is one which no humane sentiment
can contemplate with equanimity. It calls for a remedy. And it cannot wait for
the slow and problematic readjustment of demand and supply. We may start
from the proposition that common humanity requires us to seek a remedy, if one
can lawfully be found.
Wigmore, A Constitutional Way to Reach The Housing Profiteer, 15 ILL. L. REV. 359, 360
(1921).
6. "Twenty-two states and over eighty cities have enacted open housing laws ....
Comment, The Prohibition of Private Discrimination in The Rental or Sale of Real
Property, 7 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 88, 89 (1970).
7. See, e.g., the prohibitions of the federal Fair Housing Act of 1968 embodied in 42
U.S.C. § 3604 (1970).
8. See, e.g., ILL. CONST. art. I, § 17 (1970).
9. See Comment, The Fair Housing Act: Standing for the Private Attorney General,
12 SANTA CLARA LAW. 562, 568-71 (1972). It is the authors' observation that in a large urban
area such as metropolitan Chicago, rental housing discrimination against persons with
children occurs more frequently than discrimination based on religion, sex or national
origin.
10. A federal rental housing insurance program has been established with the legislative
directive that mortgage insurance benefits under the program be directed primarily to
projects with adequate housing at moderate rental charges which are available to families
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lated measures at the state legislative level began in 1898 and
have attempted to alleviate the problem. At present, there are
only six states which prohibit, in some form, discrimination in
rental policies and procedures against families with children."
The current Illinois statute will be the focal point of this
Article's analysis. Through an examination of the intent and his-
tory of the statute, a comparison with similar statutes of other
states and the conducting of numerous surveys,'2 the authors have
attempted to determine the viability of the statute and also
whether it is the most effective statute of its type.'3 The authors
also will introduce and comment upon a proposed amendment to
the current Illinois statute which will furnish an effective remedy
for discrimination victims.
with children. Pursuant to this directive, an owner seeking mortgage insurance under the
program must certify that he will not discriminate against families with children and will
not sell the property while the mortgage insurance is in effect to any one who does not so
certify. Anyone violating such certification is subject to a $500 fine. 12 U.S.C. § 1713(b)(2)
(1970).
11. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-1317 (1973); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 25, § 6503 (1975); ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 80, §§ 37-38 (1973); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 151B, § 4.11 (Supp. 1975);
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A: 170-92 (1971); N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW §§ 236-37 (McKinney 1968).
See discussion of these statutes at notes 38-52 and accompanying text infra.
12. The authors conducted the following surveys to gauge the effect of the Illinois family
status discrimination in housing statute:
a) a survey and analysis of rental housing advertisements appearing in both
metropolitan and neighborhood newspapers in the Chicagoland area during a
three week period,
b) a survey and response analysis of fifty people to determine their impressions
of and reactions to indications of preference appearing in the aforementioned
advertisements,
c) a survey and response analysis of one hundred advertisers whose advertise-
ments appeared in those newspapers during this three week period,
d) a survey and response analysis of the publishers of the sixteen newspapers
whose rental housing advertisements were surveyed and analyzed during the
three week period,
e) a survey and response analysis of the 102 state's attorneys in Illinois, and
f) a survey and response analysis of the attorneys general in Illinois and those
other states with similar statutes.
13. For purposes of this study, the authors construe viability of a remedial statute as
follows: the deterrence of the prohibited practice to a significant extent, together with the
realization of a sufficient remedy by any victim(s) of the prohibited practice, achieved
through enforcement of the statute in those instances where its mere existence did not
provide a deterrent to its violation.
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II. ILLINOIS STATUTE AND SIMILAR LEGISLATION
A. Prohibited Discrimination and Its Remedy
On June 16, 1909, Illinois, following the New Jersey example, 4
passed an act designed to prevent discrimination in rental hous-
ing policies and procedures against persons or families with chil-
dren under fourteen years of age. 5 Due to the lack of reported
legislative history, the intent of the legislators can only be in-
ferred from the statute itself." The authors feel that its purpose
was to preserve the integrity of the family by assuring them the
opportunity to reside in the apartment they desire.
An analysis of the Illinois statute indicates that it is intended
to prohibit two types of rental housing discrimination. The first
prohibition, exclusion discrimination, is the refusal to rent to
persons or families with young children.
It shall hereafter be deemed unlawful and opposed to public
policy . . . to require as a condition precedent to the leasing of
any dwelling house, flat or apartment, that the person or per-
sons desiring . . . to lease. . . shall have. . . no children under
the age of 14 years residing in their families .... 11
The second prohibition, eviction discrimination, is the eviction
of tenants because of the addition to their family of a child under
fourteen years of age through birth, adoption or other means.
[I]t shall be deemed unlawful and opposed to public policy to
insert in any lease or agreement for the letting or renting of any
dwelling house, fiat or apartment, a condition terminating said
lease if there are or shall be any such children [under 14 years
14. N.J.L. 1898, ch. 235, p. 794 (1898).
15. Section 3 of the original act no longer appears in the official statute and the nomen-
clature of the offense has been changed from "misdemeanor" to "petty offense." ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 80, §§ 37-38 (1973).
16. Since committee hearings and floor debates of either chamber in the Illinois General
Assembly were not recorded in 1909, primary evidence of the express intent of the legisla-
tors in enacting the statute is unavailable. Even a search of legislative office documents
of that period in the state capital has not revealed any background information on the
statute. Telephone conversations with Janet Lyons, Head of Government Documents
Branch, and Mary Redmond, Legislative Research Librarian, Illinois State Library,
Springfield, Illinois on March 3, 1975. The authors wish to thank both of these individuals
for their assistance.
17. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 80, § 37 (1973) (emphasis added).
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of age] in the family of any person holding such lease and oc-
cupying such dwelling house. .... 11
While these two types of discrimination are specifically prohib-
ited in the statute, they are by no means equally discernible and
susceptible to enforcement. Furthermore, only the eviction prohi-
bition affords a remedy to the discrimination victim: ". . . and
any such contract or lease containing such provision shall be
deemed opposed to public policy and entirely void as to such
provision."
9
In light of this express remedy, a judge should have no problem
in refusing to enforce such a provision in any ejectment proceed-
ings. However, if a tenant is unaware of the statute, it affords him
no benefit. Only in the situation where a tenant, or his lawyer, is
aware of the statute and the tenant is willing to be subjected to
ejectment proceedings in order to have his rights to continuation
of the lease upheld is such a remedy meaningful. In view of the
survey results indicating the lack of awareness of the statute
among both the general population ° and Illinois state's attorneys
(who are charged with the responsibility of enforcing the statute'
and thus might be expected to be more aware of its existence),22
the invalidation remedy scarcely qualifies as a completely effec-
tive means of either deterring or combatting the eviction type of
discrimination .23
In regard to exclusion discrimination, there is no effective rem-
edy available. The statute does not provide the victims any vehi-
cle through which they might gain access to the courts to redress
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. See the analysis of the Advertisement Impression Survey at notes 64-67 and accom-
panying text infra.
21. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 14, § 5 (1973).
22. See the analysis of the Illinois.State's Attorneys Survey at notes 81-88 and accompa-
nying text infra.
23. This lack of awareness of the eviction prohibition persists despite the fact that the
preprinted apartment lease form used extensively by landlords in the Chicago metropoli-
tan area specifically states, albeit in fine print under "Tenant's Use of Apartment," that:
The Apartment shall be occupied solely for residential purposes by Tenant,
those other persons specifically listed in the Application for this Lease, and any
children which may be born to or legally adopted by Tenant during the Term.
Chicago Real Estate Board, No. 15 Apartment Lease-Not Furnished (1974) (emphasis
added).
[Vol. 25:64
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their own grievances. Their only recourse is to file a complaint
with the state's attorney's office. Should a victim of exclusion
discrimination be aware of the statute's existence" and actually
file such a complaint," an imposing series of barriers to a success-
ful prosecution still remains. First, the state's attorney's office
must have sufficient manpower available to investigate and pro-
secute the case. 6 Second, any prosecution must overcome serious
evidentiary problems.27 Third, even if the victim is aware of the
statute and has filed a complaint with a state's attorney's office
and that office has successfully prosecuted the offender, the sta-
tutory penalty imposed on the offender is only a $50 to $100 fine.
This minimal fine would still not provide the victim with an
apartment, especially the desired apartment if it had already
been rented to a bona fide tenant during the period of investiga-
tion and prosecution. Additionally, it is doubtful that a statutory
penalty of such slight amount operates as an effective deterrent."
B. Judicial Interpretation of the Statute
In 1946, in People v. Metcoff,29 the Supreme Court of Illinois
rendered the only opinion directly involving the Illinois statute.'
In reversing the conviction of an alleged rental agent under the
statute,3 the court based its decision upon its finding of insuffi-
24. For an indication of the prospect of such an occurrence, see notes 64-67 and accom-
panying text infra.
25. For an indication of the number of complaints received and cases prosecuted by
state's attorneys during the last five years, see note 85 and accompanying text infra.
26. Id.
27. See notes 29-37 and accompanying text infra.
28. It is interesting to note that a private scavenger who disturbs the sleep of neighbor-
hood residents by picking up garbage prior to 7:00 A.M. may be fined an amount ten times
greater. CHICAGO, ILL., CODE §§ 167-68 (1974).
29. 392 Ill. 418, 64 N.E.2d 867 (1946).
30. However, in a recent decision the supreme court did indicate that the statute does
reflect the policy of Illinois.
We agree that the condition that not more than 25% of the home sites may
be made available to families with children violates the public policy of this
State, as reflected in sections 1 and 2 of "An Act in relation to landlord and
tenant".(ILL. REV. STAT. 1973, ch. 80, pars. 37, 38).
Duggan v. County of Cook, 60 Ill. 2d 107, 116, 324 N.E.2d 406, 411 (1975).
31. The defendant had been convicted in the Municipal Court of Chicago for refusing
to rent a second floor apartment to a woman with three children under fourteen years of
age because she could not fulfill a condition precedent that he had established that she,
or any other prospective tenant, not have any children in her family under fourteen years
of age. 392 Ill. at 420, 64 N.E.2d at 868.
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cient evidence to sustain the charge and, therefore, found it un-
necessary to rule upon the constitutionality of the statute.2 Nev-
ertheless, the court's decision in Metcoff is noteworthy because
it underscores the evidentiary problems that can arise in a prose-
cution of an alleged violation under the statute.
The court cited three evidentiary deficiencies in the state's
case, any one of which would have been fatal to a successful
prosecution. First, the state failed to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that the defendant was, in fact, the person who had refused
to rent the apartment to the complaining witness.3 The com-
plaining witness had not had any personal contact with the defen-
dant and only had phone conversations with an individual who
allegedly identified himself as the defendant. 4 Hence, if a refusal
to rent is communicated during a telephone conversation, the
victim must be able to identify the voice on the telephone as the
voice of the alleged offender and show some basis for such an
32. Id. at 423, 64 N.E.2d at 869. Although the constitutionality of this particular statute
has not yet been determined, similar legislation prohibiting discrimination in housing has
been upheld as constitutional. "Thus, the fact that § 1982 operates upon the unofficial
acts of private individuals, whether or not sanctioned by state law presents no constitu-
tional problem." Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 438 (1968) (emphasis added).
The Illinois Supreme Court, in upholding the constitutionality of a Chicago ordinance
prohibiting housing discrimination by real estate brokers, has commented:
The inquiry in due process cases has been whether the evil existed which af-
fected the public health, safety, morals or general welfare, and whether the
legislative means chosen to counter that evil were reasonable. If so, there is a
proper exercise of the "elastic police power," and no want of due process, despite
interference with individual property and contract rights. . . [The courts]
have emphasized that discrimination leads to lack of adequate housing for mi-
nority groups, which results in slum conditions, disease, crime and immorality,
which endangers the entire community (citations omitted).
Courts have then reasoned that laws prohibiting discrimination in housing are
reasonably calculated to counter such evils, and "bring substantial progress
toward the elimination of such deleterious situations." Consequently, such laws
have been repeatedly sustained as a proper exercise of the police power, and not
an infringement of due process of law.
Chicago Real Estate Bd. v. City of Chicago, 36 Il. 2d 530, 541-42, 543, 224 N.E.2d 793,
801-02 (1967).
33. 392 Ill. at 421, 64 N.E.2d at 868, citing People v. Steinbuch, 306 Ill. 441, 138 N.E.
137 (1923).
34. 392 Il. at 421, 64 N.E.2d at 868.
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identification-an extremely unlikely possibility, especially in
large urban areas where one is merely calling telephone numbers
from a newspaper advertisement. Moreover, even if a refusal to
rent is communicated during personal contact with the offender,
the question of presenting a credible witness will not be disposed
of easily, since a prospective tenant does not often view apart-
ments with a disinterested person for the convenience of later
producing a credible witness. 5 Second, the state failed to show
that the defendant was either the owner of the building in ques-
tion or that he had any official connection with the building."
Third, the state did not show that the complaining witness had
ever communicated the ages of her three children to the defen-
dant and, therefore, did not prove that the reason that the defen-
dant refused to rent the apartment to her was because she had
children under fourteen years of age.3" These evidentiary prob-
lems, especially in prosecutions in urban areas, will be difficult
to overcome.
C. Similar Statutes in Other States
Although this study is concerned primarily with the Illinois
statute, a comparative examination of similar statutes in other
states will lend additional insight into the question of whether the
Illinois statute is viable and also whether or not it is the most
effective statute possible from the standpoint of tenant protec-
tion. Presently there are six states that prohibit, in some form,
discrimination in rental policies and procedures against persons
or families with children." Each of these states has either
amended or passed these statutes or their companion penalty
35. If an investigation were conducted by a state's attorney's office, the evidentiary
problems could be overcome by a "sandwich investigation." Using this approach, teams
of investigators would seek to rent the apartment by appearing in the following order: 1)
a team posing as a married couple without children, 2) a team posing as a married couple
with a child or children of an age and number similar to the victim's, and 3) once again,
a team posing as a married couple without children.
36. 392 Ill. at 421, 64 N.E.2d at 868.
37. Id. An even more serious problem would exist whenever an entirely different reason
for refusal to rent (e.g., the apartment already being rented) is communicated, even
though the real reason for refusal was the existence of children under fourteen years of
age in the family.
38. See note 11, supra.
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statutes within the last decade. However, this recent flurry of
activity should not be construed to be the culmination of an
outpouring of public sentiment in all of these states. 9 Neverthe-
less, it is feasible to view some of this recent legislative activity
as the portent of a future trend in those states with large concen-
trations of urban population and to view such legislation collec-
tively as reflecting "a public policy favoring equality in housing
for families with children."40
New Jersey, Illinois, and New York were the first states to pass
statutes banning discrimination in rental housing against fami-
lies with children." All three statutes contain a basic prohibition
against discrimination either by refusal to rent or by insertion of
termination clauses in leases, but without any enforcement capa-
bility for the victims and with only minimal fines as a penalty.
These statutes are considered to be the traditional type in this
area because they were the first type passed and have remained
substantially unchanged since 1921.42 They do not offer any effec-
tive remedy to the prospective tenant unless they are vigorously
enforced by the appropriate authorities and, further, do not ac-
knowledge the possibility of extenuating circumstances that a
landlord might experience (e.g., one room "apartments," local
39. The recent New York amendment merely involved the transfer of the statute from
a penal code to a real property code, and the Illinois amendment only revised the nomen-
clature of the offense.
40. Comment, Landlord Tenant Reform: Arizona's Version of the Uniform Act, 16 ARIz.
L. REv. 79, 96 (1974). Although none of the six states have yet had to determine the
constitutionality of their statutes, the courts of New Jersey, New York, and Illinois have
viewed their state's statutes as expressions of their state's public policy.
But it is in the public interest that families be kept together and that children
in their growing and adolescent years have the companionship and guidance of
their parents. N.J.S. 2A:170-92, while not binding here, is nevertheless indica-
tive of the tendency of public policy to favor equality of housing as between the
childless and those having children in their families. The natural instinct of
parents is to refuse separation from their children.
Gilman v. Newark, 73 N.J. Super. 562, 591, 180 A.2d 365, 381 (1962). See also Boyd H.
Wood Co. v. Finkelstein, 193 Misc. 315, 316, 84 N.Y.S.2d 459, 460 (Sup. Ct. 1948); Duggan
v. County of Cook, 60 II. 2d 107, 324 N.E.2d 406 (1975).
41. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 80, §§ 37-38 (1973); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:170-92 (1971); N.Y.
REAL PROP. LAW §§ 236-37 (McKinney 1968).
42. The New Jersey statute was amended in 1948 to reduce the penalty clause. Now a
person violating the law is considered to be a disorderly person, subject to a penalty of
imprisonment for not more than six months, a fine of not more than $500, or both. N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 2A:169-4 (1971).
[Vol. 25:64
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health codes, elderly or infirm tenants, etc.). As such, they do not
address themselves to the grave family housing situation that
currently exists in the modern urban areas."
In the past four years three other states have passed or
amended rental statutes banning discrimination against families
with children. These are variations of the "traditional" statutes
and can be grouped into three basic categories: (1) legislation that
also prohibits the advertisement of a restriction against children,
accompanied by a stringent penalty provision;" (2) legislation
that includes a limited exclusion in favor of landlords with elderly
or infirm tenants;45 and (3) legislation that prohibits either refusal
to rent or the charging of a higher rent because of children, ac-
companied by a unique remedy allowing the victim to sue the
alleged violator and recover damages."
The Arizona statute47 contains two sections designed to be of
greater benefit to the prospective tenant than the traditional
sanction: (1) the more severe penalty for both the first conviction
($100-$500 fine) and subsequent convictions ($500 fine, 3 months
imprisonment, or both); and (2) the prohibition of discriminatory
advertising in any form, intended to reduce the flagrant abuse of
the statute and the ease of implementing discriminatory prac-
tices.
The Massachusetts statute48 incorporates the first concession to
landlords insofar as it excludes from coverage those dwellings
with three apartments or less, if one of those apartments is occu-
pied by an elderly or infirm person.49 Unfortunately, the defini-
tion of an "infirm person" as one who is disabled or suffering a
"chronic illness," absent any other guidelines, will pose contin-
ual evidentiary problems. In addition, Massachusetts has a state
agency empowered to investigate and prosecute housing discrimi-
43. "Housing shortage for families is so acute." Questionnaire response from Louis J.
Lefkowitz, New York Attorney General, by Dominick J. Tuminaro, Assistant Attorney
General, May 1, 1975.
44. ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-1317 (1973).
45. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 151B, § 4.11 (Supp. 1975).
46. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 25, § 6503 (1975).
47. ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 33-1317 (1973).
48. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 151B, § 4.11 (Supp. 1975).
49. It would seem that this statute does not exempt from coverage a new concept in
apartment life, the "adult building."
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nation complaints.50
Only the Delaware statute offers the prospective tenant the
right to sue the discriminating landlord and obtain actual "dam-
ages sustained as a result of the landlord's action."'" Such dam-
ages are difficult to prove and do not have the deterrent effect of
statutory punitive damages.52 This statute also prohibits discrim-
ination accomplished by higher rentals.
It is evident that there is no consensus among the six states
regarding the most effective means of prohibiting family status
discrimination in rental housing policies and procedures. Collec-
tively the following remedial propositions can be noted: (1) family
status discrimination in rental housing, either by refusal to rent,
insertion of termination clauses, charging of higher rent, or adver-
tising discriminatory restrictions, has been prohibited; (2) a
dwelling of three apartments or less with one of the apartments
occupied by an elderly or infirm person has been excluded from
coverage; (3) criminal sanctions range from $50 to $500 and six
months imprisonment; and (4) potential enforcement ranges
from criminal prosecution only by proper law enforcement au-
thorities to civil litigation by victimized prospective tenants.
However, not one of these statutes encompasses all of these reme-
dies.
III. DISCRIMINATORY APARTMENT RENTAL NEWSPAPER
ADVERTISEMENTS
A. Chicago Metropolitan Area Newspaper Survey and Analysis
During the three-week period from February 9, 1975 through
March 1, 1975, the authors conducted a survey of apartment
rental advertising in sixteen newspapers circulated in the Chicago
metropolitan area.53 The purpose of the survey was to confirm the
50. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 151B, § 5 (Supp. 1975).
51. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 25, § 6503 (1975).
52. The original statute provided criminal sanctions of not more than $500 fine, one
year imprisonment, or both. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 25, § 6705 (1953).
53. In order to depict an accurate portrayal of the rental housing market throughout
the entire Chicago metropolitan area, three types of newspapers were selected for analysis:
metropolitan newspapers, Chicago neighborhood newspapers, and suburban newspapers.
All three types of newspapers, even those local in nature, generally included both city and
suburb rental advertisements. Three metropolitan newspapers with a general circulation
[Vol. 25:64
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existence of rental advertisements inconsistent with the statutory
prohibition of discrimination against persons with children under
fourteen years of age and to determine the extent of such advertis-
ing. The authors feel that the extent of such advertising is an
accurate indicator of both the deterrent effect and the current
enforcement of the statute.
In conducting this survey, the authors analyzed each consecu-
tive issue of these newspapers" (limited to one edition per day in
the case of daily newspapers) whenever possible.55 During the
course of this survey, the authors analyzed 34,617 advertisements
and discovered that 5,842 (16.88%) of them contained indications
of discriminatory preferences against persons with children
under fourteen years of age. Of these 5,842 advertisements ana-
lyzed and deemed to contain indications of a discriminatory pref-
erence, there were 1,513 different advertisements involved."
The authors have broken down these survey totals into various
were analyzed: the Chicago Tribune, the Chicago Sun-Times, and the Chicago Daily
News. Also analyzed was the Chicago Defender, a metropolitan newspaper with a more
limited circulation concentrated in the black communities. Twelve neighborhood and
suburban newspapers were analyzed because they primarily serve specific sections of the
Chicago metropolitan area: Berwyn/Cicero Life, The Trib (Area 1), Suburban Life, (Sw.
and W. Suburbs); Suburbanite Economist, (S. and Sw. Chicago and Suburbs); Western
Springs Citizen, (Sw. Suburbs); Forest Park Review, (W. Suburbs); Oak Leaves, (W.
Chicago and Suburbs); West Side Times, (Cent. and W. Chicago); Buffalo Grove Herald,
(Nw. Suburbs); Harlem-Foster Times, Belmont Central Leader, Portage Park News, (N.
and Nw. Chicago and Suburbs).
54. See the Newspaper Analysis Data Folder in the DePaul Law Review office for a
breakdown of the issues analyzed; the results of such analysis for each newspaper sur-
veyed; and the analysis of each of the 129 issues in the survey. The lower number of issues
of the neighborhood and suburban newspapers reflects the fact that the majority of these
newspapers are published less frequently.
The authors wish to gratefully acknowledge the assistance of Mary Ann O'Brien and
Janice Fitzgerald for their valuable assistance in compiling this survey.
55. It is obvious that in such a survey of consecutive issues an advertisement was
analyzed as many times as it was published. However, it is also true that such an adver-
tisement might just as easily have been deemed to be one indicating no discriminatory
preference as one indicating it. Furthermore, an issue of any of these newspapers, even if
it contained advertisements previously analyzed, could have been the issue used by a
prospective tenant and, as such, would have been the primary vehicle conveying a land-
lord's discriminatory preference. Therefore, although a particular rental unit might have
been analyzed more than once, this does not tend to invalidate the results of the survey.
56. For a categorization of these advertisements into various discriminatory prefer-
ences, see Appendix A-3. See also notes 64-67 and accompanying text infra, for an explan-
ation of the criteria used to determine discriminatory preference.
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comparative summaries, including such comparisons as multiple
unit availability versus single unit availability,"7 Chicago apart-
ment versus suburb apartment advertisements, furnished versus
unfurnished apartment advertisements." Although any number
of observations may be made from this survey results, the authors
feel that the following interpretations merit special comment.
(1) The percentage of advertisements indicating discrimina-
tory preferences (16.88%) reveals that one of every six landlords
did not want tenants with children under fourteen years of age.
(2) A comparison between multiple unit availability and sin-
gle unit availability reveals that advertising landlords with only
one rental unit available wanted tenants with children under
fourteen years of age to a significantly lesser degree (19.5%) than
landlords with more than one available unit (9.8%).11
(3) Discrimination in apartment rentals against persons with
children under fourteen years of age is not limited to any partic-
ular location; rather, it pervades the entire Chicago metropoli-
tan area.
(4) There is a greater incidence of discrimination in Chicago
than in the suburbs, ranging from 46% greater (single unit avail-
ability, unfurnished apartment rentals) to 199% greater (multi-
ple unit availability, furnished apartment rentals)."o
(5) There is a greater incidence of discrimination in furnished
apartment rentals than in unfurnished apartment rentals, rang-
ing from 49.6% greater (multiple unit availability, suburban
apartment rentals) to 167.4% greater (multiple unit availability,
Chicago apartment rentals).'
57. The purpose of this breakdown was to determine whether individual landlords with
a small number of rental units discriminated more than large housing entities (e.g.,
apartment management firms, corporate landlords, and apartment complex developers)
with many units available. The authors felt that the large housing entities would be less
apt to discriminate for the following reasons: 1) the larger number of units to rent and
the frequency of continual vacancies would make such discrimination a financial liability;
2) such entities do not live in their apartment buildings; 3) the greater likelihood that
such entities would retain counsel who would be aware of the statute; and 4) the financial
wealth and volume of rental units controlled by such entities would make them prime
targets for enforcement of the statute.
58. See Appendices A-1 and A-2.
59. See note 57, supra.
60. The authors feel that this is due to the greater acceptance of children in the suburbs,
possibly due to the lower average age of suburbanites.
61. This situation reflects: 1) the furnished apartments were smaller than the unfur-
nished apartments and 2) the supplying of furniture by the landlord gives him a greater
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The pervasiveness of family status discrimination in the
Chicago metropolitan area is evident not only in the comparative
summaries of the survey results but also in the analyses. of each
of the sixteen newspapers examined."2 Half of those newspapers
contained apartment rental advertisements reflecting a dis-
criminatory preference at a rate higher than 20%; only four of the
newspapers contained rental advertisements at a rate below
10%.63
We next questioned how prospective tenants would react to
such advertisements and whether such an apparently high incid-
ence of advertisements indicating a discriminatory preference
existed, at least in part, because prospective tenants were un-
aware of the Illinois statute.
B. Advertisement Impression Survey and Analysis
To ascertain the reasonableness of the criteria used in deter-
mining whether an advertisement was discriminatory,64 the au-
thors surveyed fifty people. 5 They attempted to discover how
apartment rental advertisements containing a discriminatory
preference are interpreted by the general public and what is the
effect of these advertisements.
The survey consisted of seven questions. One question elicited
the interviewees' awareness of the Illinois statute; six questions
sought their reactions to apartment rental newspaper
advertisements." Seventy-eight percent of the persons questioned
were unaware of the existence of the statute. Such a response
lends credence to the authors' belief that the general public is
generally ignorant of the statute. Significantly, 92% to 98% of the
interviewees believed that apartment advertisers who inserted
financial stake in the apartment.
62. See Appendix A-4.
63. Since the Chicago Tribune contained 39.7% of all the advertisements analyzed, and
since their rate of discrimatory advertisements was 8.04%, the overall incidence was sub-
stantially lowered. Similarly, the low 7.6% incidence in the Chicago-North section reflects
the volume of Chicago-North advertisements that appeared in the Chicago Tribune.
64. See the summary in Appendix A-3.
65. The fifty people interviewed were selected at random. They included single and
married adult persons of various ages and ethnic backgrounds, with and without children,
who lived within the Chicago metropolitan area as apartment dwellers and homeowners.
66. See Appendix B.
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such preferences as "Adults," "Adults Only," "Mature Couple,"
"Retired Couple," "Middle-Age," and "Pensioners" would not
rent apartments to families with children under fourteen years of
age. 7 Even when the advertisement contained only a mild indica-
tion of preference, such as "ideal for" or "Small Child OK," 46%
to 68% of the interviewees felt that such advertisers would not
rent to families with children under fourteen years of age. An
additional 12% to 28% of the interviewees believed that successful
rental was only a possibility. Finally, 82% of the interviewees
indicated that if they had children under fourteen years of age,
they would not even contact advertisers who indicated that they
would not rent to persons with children of such age.
These results confirmed the authors' presumption that the gen-
eral public is unaware of the Illinois statute; a fact which ob-
viously mitigates in favor of the discriminating landlord. The
next logical step was to determine how accurate these discrimina-
tory indications were.
C. Apartment Rental Advertisers Survey and Analysis
In order to determine if the authors' analysis of the discrimina-
tory advertisements was accurate, and to ascertain some of the
reasons for such discrimination, a random selection of one
hundred of the surveyed advertisers was developed. Fifty percent
had placed discriminatory advertisements. Sixty-six percent of
the discriminating advertisers affirmed the indications of dis-
criminatory preference and stated they would not rent to families
with children; and 12% of the nondiscriminatory advertisers ex-
pressed this same policy." Six percent of the discriminating ad-
vertisers inserted provisions in their leases concerning children;
67. See the summary in Appendix A-3.
68. See the individual Survey Contact Reports in the DePaul Law Review office for a
summary of the responses.
69. Even though only 66% of the 16.88% of the discriminating advertisers actually
discriminate, this fact still results in a determination that at least 11.14% (rather than
16.88%) of all apartment rental advertisers will not rent to persons with children. Of the
83.12% of the advertisers who had been characterized earlier as not discriminating, 12%
of them actually do discriminate, thus revealing that an additional 9.97% of apartment
rental advertisers won't rent to persons with children. Therefore, a total of 21.11% of
apartment rental advertisers do discriminate.
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while none of the nondiscriminating advertisers inserted such
provisions.
In the course of these interviews, the advertisers were asked
whether they were aware of the existence of the Illinois statute
and applicable penalty, whether they would be concerned about
violating the law once they were aware of it, and whether they
would favor amending the current statute to enable the discrimi-
nation victims to sue the landlords directly. 0 Among the discrim-
inating advertisers, 78% were not aware of the statute and pen-
alty, 12% were aware of its existence, and the remainder had no
comment. Among the nondiscriminating advertisers, 64% were
unaware and 36% were aware of the statute and penalty. Forty-
eight percent of the discriminatory advertisers were not con-
cerned with violating the statute, 40% were concerned, and the
remainder had no comment. Fifty-two percent of of the nondiscri-
minating advertisers were not concerned with violating the
statute, 20% were concerned, and the rest had no comment. With
respect to the private attorney general concept, 10% of the dis-
criminating advertisers favored such legislation, 12% did not, and
the remainder expressed no opinion. Six percent of the nondiscri-
minating advertisers favored the legislation and the remainder
did not comment.
The concerns of the discriminating advertisers seemed to focus
on four primary motivating factors: (1) the apartments in ques-
tion were too small to accommodate children adequately; (2) con-
ditions in the apartment or the building posed a threat to a child's
safety; (3) the landlords did not want to risk the possible destruc-
tion of property in the apartment or building by the children; and
(4) the landlord has the right to select his tenants.7 A majority
of the comments of the nondiscriminating advertisers were
markedly parallel to those of the discriminating advertisers.72
70. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 3610-12 (1970) for an example of how the private attorney general
concept has been incorporated into the Fair Housing Act of 1968.
71. Some of the more interesting comments were: 1) The tenant has to share a bath. 2)
Why doesn't the [Chicago] Tribune let us know that such discrimination is illegal? 3)
Consider the need for peace and quiet. See the individual Survey Contact Reports in the
DePaul Law Review office for an analysis of the comments of each interviewee.
72. Id., e.g., 1) It is terrible to discriminate. 2) It is the management's policy to try to
hold down children in co-operation with the school district. 3) It is one of many unknown
statutes.
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It would be difficult to conduct a survey of landlords such as
this and not be impressed by both the intensity of emotions sur-
rounding this particular issue of disposition of one's property in
accordance with one's own preference, and by some of the partic-
ular reasons for the landlords' various preferences. Not all of these
concerns expressed by landlords should be dismissed cavalierly as
unfounded excuses for perpetuation of discrimination.7"
D. Newspaper Publishers Survey and Analysis
The authors submitted a questionnaire to the publishers of the
sixteen newspapers whose apartment rental advertisements had
been analyzed in order to elicit their opinions concerning the
statute and to procure information concerning present and future
advertising policy determinations.74 The questionnaire consisted
of the following inquiries: awareness of the Illinois statute; publi-
cation of some form of notice concerning prohibited discrimina-
tion; receipt of customer complaints; newspaper policies under
the current statute; apartment rental advertisement revenue; the
possibility of newspaper policy changes; the viability and practi-
cality of the statute; and whether it ought to be repealed. The
authors did not anticipate receiving an overwhelming response to
this questionnaire in view of the extensive amount of discrimina-
tory advertisements published by these newspapers, the poten-
tially sensitive public relations position caused by such
publication, and the understandable concern of these newspapers
73. The authors would like to comment, however, upon the opinions expressed by some
interviewees that they would either sell their apartment buildings or remove them from
the rental market if they were forced to rent to families with children. Although this type
of argument has been expressed in the past in conjunction with various fair housing laws,
the authors do not feel either that the apartment rental market has decreased because of
landlords carrying out such a threat or that this argument should be given substantial
credence in any discussion of revision of the current statute. Similarly, a contention that
the victims of the more recognized types of housing discrimination might be able to obtain
comparable housing from a non-discriminating landlord was not deemed to be sufficiently
relevant to preclude the enactment of protective federal, state and municipal fair housing
measures. The same irrelevant argument should not hinder the amendment or enactment
of measures providing the same protection from family status discrimination in rental
housing.
74. See the Publishers Questionnaire and Correspondence Folder in the DePaul Law
Review Office for a copy of the questionnaire and letters sent and an analysis of the
correspondence received.
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with any questions involving first amendment rights.
True to these expectations, only two newspapers, the Chicago
Tribune and The Trib, responded to the survey. 5 In nearly identi-
cal responses they refused to complete the questionnaire, indicat-
ing that they felt that it would be "extremely burdensome"" to
do so, but that it was their policy to encourage their advertisers
"to comply with all legal requirements affecting them." The
Chicago Tribune was the only newspaper ultimately willing to
answer some questions during a subsequent telephone conversa-
tion."
The Tribune does feel that the responsible parties in its office
are aware of the current Illinois statute. However, it would not
be willing to publish a notice in its apartment rental section
informing its readers of the prohibition of family status discrimi-
nation without a statutory amendment prohibiting publication of
rental housing advertisements which indicate a preference
against persons with children under fourteen years of age. 8 With-
75. Letters from D. M. Robertson, Sales Manager, Classified Advertising, Chicago
Tribune, April 4, 1975 and James C. Leatham, Advertising Manager, Area Publications
Corporation (publisher of The Trib), April 7, 1975 to James M. O'Brien, on file in the
DePaul Law Review office.
76. The authors feel that a close examination of both the length of the questionnaire
and the complexity of the questions would hardly lead to a characterization of the ques-
tionnaire as "extremely burdensome," especially when compared to the law enforcement
surveys, discussed at notes 81-91 and accompanying text infra.
77. Telephone conversation with George Van Wagner, Classified Advertising Depart-
ment, Chicago Tribune, April 9, 1975. The responses herein are paraphrases of Mr. Van
Wagner's telephone comments, but every effort has been expended to represent his re-
marks as accurately as possible.
In view of the fact that the Chicago Tribune (hereinafter the Tribune) contained the
largest number of apartment rental advertisements analyzed during the survey period and
is one of the largest newspapers in the state, we feel that their responses are representative
of the positions of the other newspapers surveyed.
78. Mr. Van Wagner indicated that the advertising section is considered as a reference
section for the convenience of the readers, and there is insufficient space to print all the
notices which they are requested to publish. He said that they publish the current notice
only as a courtesy to HUD (Department of Housing and Urban Development). This notice
is approximately 2" x 2,"/4", appears in Sunday editions, and reads as follows:
EQUAL HOUSING OPPORTUNITIES
Federal law and Illinois Constitution prohibit discrimination based on race,
color, religion, national origin, sex or mental and physical handicaps in connec-
tion with the sale or rental of real estate. The Chicago Tribune does not know-
ingly accept advertising in violation of these laws.
Chicago Tribune, Feb. 9, 1975, § 12, at 2, cols. 5-6. Reference to "Illinois law" and the
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out such an amendment, the Tribune indicated that it was under
no legal duty to refuse to publish rental housing advertisements
which contain such discriminatory preference.79 The Tribune does
not plan any changes in policy in these areas and stated that it
does not view this situation as a "burning issue" because families
being discriminated against appear to be able to secure alterna-
tive housing elsewhere.
If one reflects upon the widespread ignorance of the Illinois
statute, the importance of the newspaper, although a private ent-
ity, cannot be underestimated since it has an extraordinary capa-
bility of disseminating information."0
IV. LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCY SURVEYS
A. Illinois State's Attorneys Survey and Analysis
Under Illinois law, the state's attorneys in the 102 counties
throughout the state are the only persons empowered to investi-
gate and prosecute violations of this statute.8 Therefore, its via-
bility is completely dependent upon the character of its enforce-
ment by the state's attorneys' offices. In view of this situation, a
detailed questionnaire,"2 together with a cover letter outlining its
purpose, was sent to each of the 102 offices.83 Ultimately, respon-
discrimination basis of "children under 14 years of age residing in a family" are conspicu-
ous by their absence. In view of the fact that in a Sunday edition as many as eight pages
and seventy-seven columns are devoted to apartment rental advertisements, and that
necessary additions to the size of the current notice would be minimal, the authors fail to
find this space limitation rationale at all compelling.
79. Mr. Van Wagner did point out that they do advise each advertiser of the existence
of the child discrimination statute and the potential liability involved, but he still felt that
a decision to refuse to publish a rental advertisement containing such discriminatory
preferences would be bordering on censorship.
80. The authors remain extremely interested in the questions propounded in this news-
paper publishers survey and would welcome a complete response to this questionnaire
from any or all of the newspapers analyzed.
81. ILL. Rav. STAT. ch. 14, § 5 (1973).
82. The survey was conducted with a series of companion questions enabling the au-
thors to verify the accuracy of the responses.
83. Four weeks later, duplicate questionnaires were sent to those state's attorneys who
either had failed to respond to the initial request or had not furnished a complete response.
It should be noted that not all the respondents answered each question in detail. See the
Illinois State's Attorneys Questionnaire and Correspondence Folder in the DePaul Law
Review Office for copies of the questionnaire, letters, and an analysis of the responses.
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ses were received from 48 offices (47.1%), including those in eight
of the ten most populous counties.84
The first inquiry in the questionnaire concerned their aware-
ness of the statute and the extent of discrimination in their
county. Approximately 49% of the respondents admitted that the
attorneys in their offices were not even aware of the statute. Fur-
thermore, from 76.2% to 90.5% of the responding state's attorneys
felt that the "typical" housing rental market advertiser, landlord
and consumer in their counties were not aware of the statute.
Forty-one percent of the respondents indicated that they did not
have any idea of the amount of family status discrimination re-
flected in the advertising in their counties.
Another inquiry pertained to consumer complaints and investi-
gation and enforcement of the statute absent such complaints.
Only two consumer complaints occurred statewide during the
entire period from 1970 through 197511 and no one indicated that
his office investigated and enforced the statute without such com-
plaints. Only three offices periodically scrutinized the advertising
in their counties for discriminatory rental practices.
In response to the inquiries concerning enforcement manpower
availability and utilization, it was revealed that an average of
less than forty minutes per county per year were spent investi-
gating and prosecuting the statute. Moreover, there were no
prosecutions conducted from 1970 through 1974. Seventy-one per-
cent of the respondents felt that they had sufficient manpower
allocated to enforce the statute with deterrent effect. This re-
sponse is highly questionable in view of the small amount of time
spent investigating and prosecuting complaints over the past five
84. See the Viability Questionnaire Cumulative Summary in the DePaul Law Review
Office. Although the authors are grateful to all of those state's attorneys who responded,
we especially would like to thank the state's attorneys of the following counties for the
time and efforts which they expended to respond to the questionnaire in great detail:
Brown, Clark, Cook, Crawford, Cumberland, De Kalb, De Witt, Edgar, Fayette, Fulton,
Gallatin, Hancock, Iroquois, Jackson, Kankakee, Lake, Lawrence, Lee, Livingston,
Logan, Macoupin, Madison, Marshall, Mason, McDonough, Montgomery, Morgan, Moul-
trie, Peoria, Pope, Pulaski, Putnam, Rock Island, Scott, Stephenson, Wabash, Wayne,
and Winnebago.
85. A few state's attorneys indicated that they could not give a response for the years
of 1970, 1971, and/or 1972 because they were not in office during that period and did not
feel that they could comment accurately about their predecessor's term of office.
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years. Furthermore, 63.4% of the respondents indicated that their
offices did not have any additional manpower which realistically
could be utilized to aid investigation and enforcement of the stat-
ute.
Another inquiry concerned the effectiveness of the statute.
Only two state's attorneys felt that the existing statute and their
enforcement of it is having a deterrent effect in their counties.
Surprisingly, in view of the aforementioned responses, only 31.2%
of the respondents felt that the statute was not viable in their
counties, and only 12.5% felt that stronger sanctions and/or larger
fines would increase its effectiveness.
Considering the very minimal enforcement of the statute re-
flected in the state's attorneys responses, it was interesting that
only 38.2% of the respondents were in favor of amending the
existing statute "to incorporate the private attorney general con-
cept similar to that utilized in the federal Fair Housing Act of
1968," and only 21.2% of the respondents felt that such an
amendment would ease their current enforcement burden.86 On
the other hand, 34.6% of the respondents felt that such an amend-
ment "would furnish the consumer a more effective remedy than
the existing one.""7
Approximately 65% of the respondents were of the opinion that
the statute should be amended to allow landlords some latitude
in rental policies for reasons of general health and safety. For the
same reason, 75.8% of the respondents felt that landlords should
be allowed to preclude families with children of any age from
rental housing containing one bedroom (or sleeping area) or less.
Finally, 90% of the respondents did not favor repeal of the stat-
ute.8
86. The responses that follow are representative of those given as explanations of the
answers to this question. One who favored the amendment said: "Undoubtedly, any relief
welcome." (Logan County). Those opposing the amendment said: "Because in our county
we don't tolerate discrimination of any kind and everybody here knows it." (Lee County);
"Because it is not our duty to enforce." (Madison County); "Average complainant not
sophisticated enough." (Kane County).
87. Additional comments favoring the amendment: "[O.K.] in counties which are
understaffed." (Fulton County). Opposing the amendment: "Unnecessary duplication."
(De Kalb County); "Centralized law enforcement is more effective for uniform policy and
prosecution." (Moultrie County); "Because a local prosecutor is better able to enforce the
laws than some appointed statewide bureaucrat." (Lee County).
88. Some additional comments received regarding the questionnaire were: "Chap. 80 §
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In view of these responses, the obvious conclusion is that effec-
tive enforcement of the statute is virtually nonexistent. This lack
of enforcement has resulted and will continue to result in the
ability of advertisers to discriminate in rental housing with com-
plete impunity so long as the current statute remains unchanged,
or until prospective tenants with children bring pressure to bear
upon the state's attorneys to prosecute discriminating landlords.
B. Attorneys General Survey and Analysis
As an adjunct to the Illinois state's attorneys survey, the au-
thors conducted a similar survey of the attorneys general of the
six states with such statutes."9 The survey was designed to deter-
mine: (1) the exposure of the attorneys general to their respective
statutes; (2) their involvement with the enforcement of these
statutes; and (3) to obtain their opinions regarding the viability
of their statutes. Only four attorneys general responded to the
questions presented. 0
These responses,9 ' primarily due to a professed lack of jurisdic-
tion, are of little significance other than to support the results of
37 has not been a significant problem in this office for a period in excess of two years."
(Cook County); "To my knowledge there has been little publicity relevant to this statute.
With more publicity-more complaints and then more prosecutions." (Winnebago
County); "The problem in our county is not with the landlords, but with the tenants."
(Scott County).
89. Despite the fact that the Delaware Attorney General has minimal responsibilities
because a private citizen can bring suit, a questionnaire was submitted to him.
90. See the Attorneys General Questionnaire and Correspondence Folder in the DePaul
Law Review office. Three attorneys general adequately completed the questionnaire: Ari-
zona, Delaware, and New York. The New Jersey Attorney General referred it to the
Division of Civil Rights of the Department of Law and Public Safety of that state. The
director of that agency, Mr. Vernon Potter, while responding to certain questions, indi-
cated that his office was not responsible for enforcing the New Jersey statute. The Massa-
chusetts Attorney General's office referred the questionnaire to the Massachusetts Com-
mission on Discrimination, from whom the authors have not received a response. The
Illinois Attorney General also declined to complete the questionnaire, stating that his
office had not had occasion to address itself to the subject nor to compile data on such
matters because his office was not empowered to enforce the statute.
91. The following comments were the only additional remarks received along with the
regular responses to the questionnaire: "What few complaints we have received which
would involve this provision concerned landlords refusing to rent to families with three or
more children. No action was taken and the families sought housing elsewhere." (Ari-
zona); "To my knowledge D.A.'s in large cities accord low priority to prosecution of such
complaints." (New York).
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the Illinois state's attorneys survey. Nevertheless, the authors did
sense a general lack of exposure to the respective statutes on the
part of the respondents which would seem to indicate a dearth of
both consumer awareness and enforcement of these statutes.
V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
In reaching any final determination regarding the viability of
the Illinois statute, the following conclusions, derived from the
research and surveys discussed in this article, merit attention. A
distressingly large majority of Illinois residents, as well as at least
40% of the state's attorneys, are unaware of the existence or con-
tents of the statute. Due to this lack of awareness, victims of the
prohibited discrimination are not filing complaints against dis-
criminating landlords and without these complaints state's attor-
neys are not enforcing this statute. Sociological and personnel
priorities within the offices of the state's attorneys further limit
their enforcement efforts. Landlords in the Chicago metropolitan
area are precluding families with children under fourteen years
of age at a rate of 16.9 to 21.1%,2 thereby limiting the available
apartment rentals in this market. This market is made even
smaller by the large number of discriminatory apartment rental
advertisements published, since prospective tenants are unlikely
to even contact such advertisers in order to explore the possibility
of the acceptance of children. In addition, newspapers are loath
to voluntarily limit or abandon the publication of this type of
advertisement due to the economic benefits derived from them as
well as their concern with first amendment rights. The cumula-
tive weight of these observations has led the authors to conclude
that Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 80, §§ 37-38 (1973) is not a viable statute
whatsoever."
Since it is not functioning in its present form and since there
is a definite need for such a statute in modern urban living, the
authors propose that Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 80, §§ 37-38 (1973) be
amended by the following suggested legislation.
92. See note 69 and accompanying text supra.
93. See note 13 supra for the authors' definition of viability.
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THE ILLINOIS CHILDREN IN HOUSING ACT
Be it enacted by the People of the State of Illinois, represented
in the General Assembly:
§ 1. Sections 37 and 38 of Chapter 80 of the Illinois Revised
Statute are hereby repealed.
§ 1-1. This Act may be cited as the Children in Housing Act.
§ 1-2. Definitions: In this Act the following definitions will
apply unless otherwise indicated:
(a) Rental building: any building, dwelling house,
mobile home, hotel or other structure which contains
one or more living units not occupied by the owner of
such living unit.
(b) Living unit: any apartment, flat, dwelling house
room, hotel room, mobile home interior or other prem-
ises within a rental building designed, adapted, utilized
or occupied as a place of habitation by one or more
persons.
(c) Rent or Rental: the agreement between any owner
of a rental building or living unit to allow a person to
occupy or possess a living unit in return for the payment
of money.
(d) Lease: the rental agreement in subsection 1-2(c)
reduced to written terms.
(e) Person: any individual, company, corporation,
partnership or other association.
(f) Landlord: the person entering into a rental agree-
ment for a living unit on behalf of the owner of such
living unit and whose responsibility it is to manage the
operation of such living unit or rental building.
(g) Tenant: the person occupying or possessing a living
unit by virtue of a rental agreement.
(h) Owner: the owner or any agent of the owner of a
rental building or living unit.
§ 2. It shall hereafter be deemed unlawful and opposed to pub-
lic policy upon the part of any owner of any living unit, under-
taking to rent the same, to:(a) require as a condition precedent
to the rental of any living unit, that the person desiring to rent
such living unit have no children residing in their families;(b)
demand or receive a greater sum as a rental fee for the use and
occupancy of any living unit because the person renting or desir-
ing to rent such living unit has a child or children residing in
their families; or(c) insert in any lease a condition terminating
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said lease if there are or shall be any children in the family of
any person holding such lease and occupying such living unit,
and any such lease containing such provision shall be deemed
opposed to public policy and entirely void as to such provision.
Comment: This section retains the condition precedent and
lease provision prohibitions (exclusion and eviction) from the pre-
vious statute. The age demarcation of 14 years has been aban-
doned for two principal reasons: (1) the authors have failed to
discover any compelling argument for the maintenance of such an
arbitrary differentiation;93' and (2) if the protection of the unity
and integrity of the family is one of the primary goals of this and
similar statutes, such protection certainly warrants continuation
beyond a child's elementary school years. The prohibition of
higher rental fees, as found in the recently amended Delaware
statute, 4 has been added to prevent the infliction of economic
hardship upon discrimination victims or to effectively exclude
them. Thus, this section addresses itself to and prohibits the
three primary means of direct discrimination employed by the
owners of rental buildings against persons with children.
§ 2-1. Section 2(a) above shall not apply to any living unit
whenever the rental by its owner to the person desiring to rent
such living unit with children residing in their families is in
violation of space requirements embodied within a reasonable
local housing code which is in full force and effect.
Comment: This subsection is designed to avoid a possible con-
flict with reasonable local housing codes which might place a
restriction upon the number of persons who may occupy a partic-
ular type of living unit, such as one bedroom apartments. This
provision will alleviate one of the major concerns of landlords that
an apartment is too small for children. Without this provision, an
owner might find himself in a situation where he would be in
violation of the law for refusing to rent a small apartment to a
large family. 5 While this subsection is a compromise between the
93.1. None of the other five states with such statutes have seen fit to similarly limit
the effectiveness of their respective statutes by the inclusion of such an unacceptable age
differentiation, possibly due to the realization that no longer do children join the labor
force on a full-time basis as early in their lives as they did in 1909.
94. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 25, § 6503 (1975).
95. See, e.g., CHICAGO, ILL., CODE §§78-16.1 and 78-16.2 (1974), which regulate space
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landlords' concern over space limitations and the rental needs of
families, the exemption which the subsection provides must be
based upon reasonable health considerations contained in a valid
local housing code and does not negate the intent of the statute
insofar as large families are concerned. This potential exemption
of some relatively small apartments from coverage under the stat-
ute will not affect the constitutionality of the statute."
§ 2-2. Section 2(a) above shall not apply to a rental building
if, within one year and one day from either: (1) the effective date
of this Act; or (2) the date on which the living units within such
rental building are first made available for rent; or (3) the date
on which such rental building is sold or otherwise conveyed in
fee simple; the owner of any such rental building shall:
(a) have filed or caused to have been filed an Adult Building
Certificate with the recorder of the county in which such build-
ing is located; and
(b) have rented or caused to have been rented 50% or more of
the living units in such rental building to elderly or infirm per-
sons.
Comment: This subsection is designed to make the statute com-
patible with an emerging concept in housing, the "adult living"
building or complex designed as a quiet environment for senior
citizens, and to provide the same type of environment for disa-
bled persons. It will enable an owner to commit his premises to
senior citizens and disabled tenants by declaring his intent to do
requirements for family dwelling units and for sleeping rooms. They require not only more
square footage in family dwelling units with greater occupancy, but also minimum
amounts of square footage in the sleeping rooms of such units, depending upon the number
of occupants of the sleeping rooms.
96. The Supreme Court of Illinois has stated:
The legislature is under no duty to extend regulatory measures to all fields in
which there may be abuses, and it may confine its restrictions to those classes
of cases where the need is deemed to be the clearest. . . . It is a legislative
question whether an evil exists which requires means to be taken for its suppres-
sion and what those means shall be, and its acts to that end will not be interfered
with unless clearly in violation of some constitutional limitation. The legislature
may consider degrees of evil and is not bound to pass such a law as will meet
every case. It has wide discretion in classifying the objects of its legislation and
such classification need not be scientific or logically appropriate. If uniform
within the class and not palpably arbitrary it will be sufficient.
Chicago Real Estate Bd. v. City of.Chicago, 36 Ill. 2d 530, 545-47, 224 N.E.2d 793, 803-04
(1967).
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so and then by making the commensurate commitment of living
units within a year and a day. This period furnishes an owner
sufficient time to make and declare such commitment and also,
once this is made, to serve present tenants with adequate notices
of nonrenewal of their leases, if the owner so desires, thereby
facilitating the effectuation of such commitment. This subsection
will be upheld as constitutional. 7
§ 2-2.1. For the purposes of subsection 2-2 above, "elderly per-
son" shall mean a person sixty years of age or over, and an
"infirm person" shall mean a person who is seriously disabled
or suffering from a chronic illness. Proof of such disability or
illness shall be by certification from a practicing physician of
this State.
Comment: This subsection reflects the Massachusetts concept
of limited exemptin involving only elderly and infirm persons,
and adaptations of the definitions of the Massachusetts statute
have been incorporated herein."8 Although the definition of "in-
firm person" might be attacked as vague or ambiguous, more
precise terminology has not been implemented because of the
hazard of arbitary classification. The disability certification re-
quirement should alleviate this problem somewhat. This limited
exemption will not materially negate the intent and effect of this
statute.
§ 2-2.2. Once the owner of such rental building shall have
complied with the filing requirement of subparagraph (a) of
subsection 2-2 above, section 2(a) of this Act and subparagraph
(b) of subsection 2-2 above shall not apply to such rental build-
ing for the remainder of the applicable period of one year and
one day of subsection 2-2 above, thereby allowing the owner of
such rental building that remaining period to comply with the
requirement of subparagraph (b) of subsection 2-2 above.
Comment: This paragraph of subsection 2-2 tolls the applica-
tion of section 2(a) during the entire 366 day commitment period
set forth in subsection 2-2, thereby allowing a landlord to (1)
97. The constitutionality of this subsection is supported by the same reasoning and
decision as outlined in note 96 supra, and the Comment accompanying subsection 2-1
supra.
98. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 151B, § 4.11 (Supp. 1974).
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declare the formal commitment of his premises to senior citizens
or infirm people at an early stage of the commitment period, (2)
thereby toll the application of section 2(a) to his premises for the
remainder of the commitment period, and (3) then utilize that
remaining portion of the 366 day commitment period to effec-
tuate the commitment of his premises required under subpara-
graph (b) of subsection 2-2.
§ 2-2.3. Should the owner of such rental building, after having
complied with the requirements of subsection 2-2 above, rent
one of the living units in such rental building to a person with
children residing in their families, such action on the part of the
owner shall automatically revoke any Adult Building Certificate
filed for such rental building in accordance with subparagraph
(a) of subsection 2-2, and such action shall thereafter prevent
such owner from renewing, refiling or filing an Adult Building
Certificate for such rental building under subparagraph (a) of
subsection 2-2.
Comment: This provision embodies the sanction which pre-
vents an owner from utilizing the Adult Building Certificate
merely as a superficial means of avoiding application of section
2(a) to his premises. It requires each owner either to stand by his
commitment of the premises as an adult building even to the
extent of possibly suffering financial hardship or else face auto-
matic revocation of his Adult Building Certificate. In effect it
requires each commitment of premises to be a serious commit-
ment and provides some protection to elderly or infirm tenants
relying on it. At the same time it allows an owner to reconsider
his commitment and rent the premises to families with children.
§ 3. It shall be unlawful to make, print, or publish, or cause
to be made, printed, or published any notice, statement, or
advertisement, with respect to the rental of a living unit, that
indicates any preference, limitation or discrimination prohib-
ited by Article 1, Section 17 of the Illinois Constitution of 1970
or prohibited by section 2 of this Act.
Comment: This section is an adaptation of the discriminatory
preference publication prohibitions currently embodied in the
Arizona statute99 and the federal Fair Housing Act of 1968. °10 This
99. ARz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-1317 (1973).
100. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(c) (1970).
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section is one of the most important sections of the act and is
designed to preclude the widespread dissemination of an owner's
discriminatory preferences violative of the statute.
Although the constitutionality of the Arizona provision has not
yet been determined, the constitutionality of it and of this section
would be upheld upon the same considerations under which the
federal prohibition of discriminatory advertising in rental housing
has been upheld. 0'
101. See United States v. Hunter, 459 F.2d 205, 215 (4th Cir. 1972) where the circuit
court held that both landlords and newspapers are in the purview of the federal statute,
declaring that the
. application of § 3604(c) [42 U.S.C. § 3604(c)-the federal discriminatory
advertisement prohibition] to newspapers does not contravene freedom of the
press protected by the First Amendment.
• . .neither due process nor equal protection is abridged by a statute forbidding
newspapers from carrying discriminatory housing advertisements (citation
omitted).
See Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376 (1973)
and Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942), where the United States Supreme Court
upheld regulation of advertising. Contra, Bigelow v. Virginia, 95 S. Ct. 2222 (1975) and
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), where the Court struck down
advertising regulations as unconstitutional restrictions of commercial speech.
Similar to the handbill advertisement in Chrestensen, an apartment rental advertise-
ment does "no more than propose a purely commercial transaction." 95 S.Ct. at 2232. But
unlike the published material in New York Times Co., a published apartment rental
advertisement has not
communicated information, expressed opinion, recited grievances, protested
claimed abuses, and sought financial support on behalf of a movement whose
existence and objectives are matters of the highest public interest and concern.
376 U.S. at 266. Also unlike the advertisement in Bigelow, an apartment rental advertise-
ment does not convey
information of potential interest and value to a diverse audience-. . .to those
with a general curiosity about, or genuine interest in, the subject matter or the
law of another State and its development ...
95 S.Ct. at 2233. Rather, an apartment rental advertisement conveys information of
potential interest and value only to "readers possibly in need of the services offered." Id.
In view of the propriety of the state's interest and purpose in regulating apartment
rentals, the language stressed in Pittsburgh Press Co. and mentioned with particularity
in Bigelow, is deemed to be controlling and to support this section's constitutionality:
Any First Amendment interest which might be served by advertising an
ordinary commercial proposal and which might arguably outweigh the govern-
mental interests supporting the regulation is altogether absent when the com-
mercial activity is itself illegal and the restriction on advertising is incidental
to a valid limitation on economic activity.
95 S.Ct. at 2232, citing from 413 U.S. at 389 (emphasis added).
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§3-1. It shall be unlawful to make, print, or publish, or cause
to be made, printed, or published any listings of notices, state-
ments, or advertisements, with respect to the rental of a living
unit whenever such listing does not include a notice prominently
displayed in such listing that describes in detail the prohibitions
regarding the rental of a living unit as set forth in section 2 of
this Act.
Comment: This subsection is specifically designed to increase
the awareness of the public regarding the existence of the statute.
Only a public informed of its rights as prospective tenants can
utilize whatever remedies or enforcement measures are available
to them upon encountering a violation of the statute. In view of
the commercial speech aspects of this advertising, the authors
feel that this publication of notice requirement is constitutional
as are the clear and conspicuous notice requirements embodied
in various sections of the federal Consumer Credit Protection
Act. 102
§3-2. It shall be unlawful for any owner to fail to include in any
lease for a living unit a notice prominently displayed in such
lease that states:
It is unlawful to refuse to rent any living units to a
person or persons solely on the ground that such persons
have in their family a child or children, unless otherwise
provided by law.
Comment: This subsection also is designed specifically to in-
crease a tenant's awareness of the statute by furnishing a tenant
a statement concerning the statutory right to freedom from fam-
ily status discrimination in rental housing.'"3
§4. A summary of the Landlord-Tenant Code of this State,"°4
as prepared by the Attorney General of this State, shall be given
by the landlord to the tenant subject to a knowledgeable and
voluntary release at the tenant's expense. In the event that the
landlord has not furnished such a summary to the tenant, and
in the further event that the tenant has not complied with a
102. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 1631, 1663 (1970).
103. The constitutional basis of this subsection, especially since it applies to commer-
cial entrepreneurs, is similar to that set forth in note 101 supra, and the comment accom-
panying subsection 3-1 supra.
104. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 80 (1973).
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lease, ignorance of the law may be pleaded by the tenant in any 04
court of law or equity, and shall be a valid defense.
Comment: An adaptation of a Delaware provision, this section
is designed not only to increase tenants' awareness of the statute
specifically, but also their awareness of the entire Illinois
Landlord-Tenant Code generally.' ° Although it appropriately
penalizes an owner for noncompliance, the transmittal of such
information actually serves the interests of both the owner and
the tenant, since the desired result would be tenants who are
more informed not only of their rights, but also of their responsi-
bilities and potential liabilities.
§5. Any person violating any of the provisions of sections 2, 3,
or 4 of this Act or any subsections of those sections of this Act
shall be deemed guilty of a petty offense and shall be fined
$500.00 for each and every offense and costs.
Comment: The criminal sanction applicable under a successful
prosecution by a state's attorney's office has been raised to the
same level as Arizona and New Jersey to help increase the overall
deterrent effect of the statute.
§6. The provisions of subsections 6-1 through 6-6 of this Act
are to be construed as providing victims of family status
discrimination, in violation of sections 2, 3, or 4 of this Act or
their subsections, the procedure whereby they can enforce their
rights under this Act against any person responsible for such
discrimination in a civil action in any court of law or equity in
this State.'
105. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 25, § 6504 (1975) and ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 80 (1973).
106. The provisions of subsection 6-1 to h and section 7 are patterned after the private
attorney general concept embodied in the federal Fair Housing Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. §§
3610-12, 3617 (1970). This feature was incorporated due to the insufficient manpower to
properly administer the act. See Brief for the United States as amicus curiae at 21,
Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205 (1972). These subsections will
eliminate the present total dependence of discrimination victims upon the indifferent or
overburdened state's attorneys' offices.
The risk of harassment and frivolous lawsuits is not a factor that mitigates against its
inclusion. The amendment requires the private party: to file his complaint within 120
days; to have the burden of proof; and to pay for the prosecution of such a suit. Damages
are discretionary and maximum punitive damages are specifically provided for. In addi-
tion, the risk of multiple lawsuits might serve as an incentive not to discriminate. See
Comment, supra note 9, at 572 for a similar critique of the federal provision.
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§6-1. Any person who claims to have been injured by a dis-
criminatory housing practice prohibited by Article 1, Section 17
of the Illinois Constitution of 1970 or prohibited by sections 2,
3, or 4 of this Act or by their subsections, or who believes that
he will be irrevocably injured by such a discriminatory housing
practice (hereinafter person aggrieved) may file a complaint
with the state's attorney in the county in which such act oc-
curred or is about to occur. A complaint must be filed within 120
days after the alleged discriminatory housing practice occurred.
Complaints shall be in writing and shall state the facts upon
which the allegations of a discriminatory housing practice are
based. Complaints may be reasonable and fairly amended at
any time. All complaints must be verified.
Comment: This subsection is patterned after §§ 3610(a)-(b) of
the federal Fair Housing Act of 1968 (such act hereinafter referred
to as Title VIII) and describes the initial procedures for prosecu-
tion of a violation of this statute. The term "person aggrieved"
refers to any person injured or about to be injured, including
direct or indirect victims of discrimination.
§6-2. The state's attorney shall investigate the complaint
within 21 days after receiving the complaint and shall give no-
tice in writing to the person aggrieved within 28 days after re-
ceiving the complaint whether he intends to prosecute the al-
leged violation. If within 28 days after a complaint is filed, the
state's attorney has not begun to prosecute the alleged violation
or notified the person aggrieved in writing of his intention to do
so, the person aggrieved may, within 28 days thereafter, com-
mence a civil action in any appropriate county circuit court to
enforce the rights granted or protected by this Act or by Article
1, Section 17 of the Illinois Constitution of 1970, insofar as such
rights relate to the subject of the complaint. If the court finds
that a prohibited discriminatory housing practice has occurred
or is about to occur, the court may, subject to rules and statute,
enjoin the respondent from engaging in such practice or order
such affirmative action as may be appropriate.
Comment: This subsection is patterned after § 3610(d) of Title
VIII and provides a reasonable opportunity for a state's attorney's
office to act and also provides a victim a civil remedy to employ
if a state's attorney fails to prosecute the alleged violator. The
reduction of the time period for investigation and prosecution by
19751
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the state's attorney as compared to the time period under Title
VIII is a recognition of the fact that "time is of the essence" in a
rental housing discrimination situation.'07
§6-3. In any proceeding brought pursuant to this section and
the subsections of this section, the burden of proof shall be on
the complainant.
Comment: This subsection is a duplication of § 3610(c) of Title
VIII and is an affirmance of the prevalent burden of proof rule in
such a matter.
§6-4. Any sale, encumbrance or rental consummated prior to
the issuance of any court order issued under the authority of this
section and the subsections of this section, and involving a bona
fide purchaser, encumbrancer, or tenant without actual notice
of the existence of the filing of a complaint or civil action under
the provisions of this statute, shall not be affected by such court
order.
Comment: This subsection is a duplication of the protective
proviso in § 3612(a) of Title VIII and is designed to protect those
parties who deal with a discriminating landlord in good faith
subsequent to a violation of the statute.
§6-5. To the extent not inconsistent with the law or procedures
of this State, and upon application by the plaintiff and in such
circumstances as the court may deem just, the court in which a
civil action under this statute has been brought may appoint an
attorney for the plaintiff and may authorize the commencement
of a civil action upon proper showing without the payment of
fees, costs or security.
Comment: This subsection is an adaptation of § 3612(b) of Title
VIII and is intended to make a victim's redress of a grievance
under the statute no more dependent upon wealth than upon the
enforcement decison of an understaffed and overburdened state's
attorney's office.
107. Comment, supra note 9, at 577.
. . . most state procedural systems require an excessive amount of time to
reach a decision and . . . most state housing commissions [are unable] to
prevent the homeowner from selling or leasing the property during the pendency
of the commission's decision.
Comment, supra note 6, at 90.
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§6-6. The court may grant as relief, as it deems appropriate,
any permanent or temporary injunction, temporary restraining
order, or other order, and may award to the plaintiff actual
damages and not more than $1,000.00 punitive damages, to-
gether with court costs and reasonable attorney fees in the case
of a prevailing plaintiff.
Comment: This subsection is an adaptation of § 3612(c) of Title
VIII and is intended to provide a "broad spectrum of affirmative
and other relief" and can "be effectively used to permit a private
party to secure the elimination of all acts of discrimination prac-
ticed by [a] defendant.' '0 8
§7. It shall be unlawful to coerce, intimidate, threaten, or in-
terfere with any person in the exercise or enjoyment of, or on
account of his having exercised or enjoyed, or on account of his
having aided or encouraged any other person in the exercise or
enjoyment of, any right granted or protected by sections 2
through 6 of this Act and by Article 1, Section 17 of the Illinois
Constitution of 1970. This section may be enforced by appropri-
ate civil action.
Comment: This section is an adaptation of § 3617 of Title VIII
and is intended to prevent the infliction of harassment from oper-
ating as an inhibition upon the lawful exercise of a victim's re-
dress of a grievance arising under this statute.
§8. The provisions of this Act are hereby declared to be separa-
ble, and if any section or part of this Act is declared to be
unconstitutional, such unconstitutionality shall not affect the
validity of the remaining portions of the Act if they can be given
effect without the invalid portions.
108. Comment, supra note 9, at 575.
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APPENDIX A-3
DISCRIMINATORY PREFERENCE ADVERTISEMENT
BREAKDOWN SUMMARY
General
Classification
Adults Only
Mature Adults
Working Adults
Elderly Couple
Single Person
(Predom. Female)
No Children
Married Couples
Over 30
Bachelor
No Small Child
Small Child OK
Adults Preferred
Elderly "
Single Person
Young Couple
Ideal For Adults
Seniors
Over 30
Working
People
Singles
Working Couple,
1 Child OK
C S SW N NW W
0 258 21 92 155
0 37 4 7 10
0 29 3 0 5
0 17 1 2 5
0 7 2 5 5
0 11 0 7 25
0 4 0 2 3
0 2 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0
0 0 00 0
0 0 1 16 9
0 3 0 0 3
0 0 0 3 2
0 0 0 2 1
0 1 1 0 0
0 0 1 0 0
0 2 0 0 0
0 3 0 0 0
0 1 0 7 0
0 2 0 0 3
Unfurn. Furn.
Suburb. Chic.
0 3 1
1 0 0
0 378 34 144 226 287 259 62 1,513
Note: 91.54"' of all of the individual discriminatory preference advertisements are
represented in the first ten general classifications (1,385 of the 1,513 individual discrim-
inatory preference advertisements). These ten general classifications do not include the
"preferred" or "ideal for.. '." general classifications.
The first six columns above indicate unfurnished apartments located within Chicago
according to the type of sectional breakdown previously illustrated in Appendix A-1 and
represented by abbreviation.
Furn.
Suburb. Total
Total
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APPENDIX A-4
INDIVIDUAL NEWSPAPER ANALYSIS SUMMARY
No. of No. of Discrim- Discrimin-
Issues Newspaper No. of Ads inatory Ads atory Ad %
18 Chicago Daily News 4,965 1,301 26.20%
12 Chicago Defender 811 121 14.92%
20 Chicago Sun-Times 10,266 2,351 22.90%
21 Chicago Tribune 13,742 1,105 8.04%
2 Belmont Central Leader 71 21 29.58%
9 Berwyn Cicero Life 1,438 383 26.63%
18 Buffalo Grove Herald 1,209 62 5.13%
2 Forest Park Review 7 2 28.57%
3 Harlem-Foster Times 172 27 15.70%
2 Oak Leaves 319 84 26.33%
3 Portage Park News 413 164 39.71%
2 Suburbanite Economist 337 61 18.10%
6 Suburban Life 432 93 21.53%
4 The Trib (area 1) 170 15 8.82%
2 Western Springs Citizen 60 4 6.67%
5 West Side Times 205 48 23.41%
129 16 Newspapers 34,617 5,842 16.88%
APPENDIX B
ADVERTISEMENT IMPRESSION SURVEY SUMMARY
No. of People Surveyed-50
1. Are you aware of Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 80, §§ 37-38 (1973)?
Yes - 11 (22%) No - 39 (78%)
2. Will those advertisers who indicate "Adults Only" in their advertisements rent their
apartments to families with children under 14 years of age?
Yes - 1 (2%) No - 49 (98%)
3. Will those advertisers who indicate "Over 30" in their advertisements rent their
apartments to families with children under 14 years of age?
Yes - 3 (6%) No - 46 (92%) Possibly - 1 (2%)
4. Will those advertisers who indicate "Mature Couple," "Retired Couple," "Elderly
Couple," "Middle-Age," "Pensioners," etc. rent their apartments to families with
children under 14 years of age?
Yes - 0 (0%) No - 49 (98%) Possibly - 1 (2%)
5. Will those advertisers who indicate "Ideal for Married Couple" or "Ideal for Sin-
gles" rent their apartments to families with children under 14 years of age?
Married Couple:
Yes - 13 (26%) No - 23 (46%) Possibly - 14 (28%)
Singles:
Yes - 10 (20%) No - 28 (56%) Possibly - 12 (24%)
6. Will those advertisers who indicate "Small Child OK" rent their apartments to
families with children who are 12 or 13 years of age?
Yes - 10 (20%) No - 34 (68%) Possibly - 6 (12%)
7. If you had children under 14 years of age in your family and were seeking to rent an
apartment, would you contact those advertisers whom you felt would not rent their
apartment to you because you had children under 14 years of age in your family?
Yes - 6 (12%) No - 41 (82%) Possibly - 3 (6%)
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